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Abstract 
Atypical or contingent work arrangements have long been criticized as offering more 
precarious and lower paid work than regular open-ended employment. An important British 
paper by Booth et al. (2002) was among the first to recognize that notwithstanding their 
potential deficiencies, such jobs also functioned as a stepping stone to permanent work. This 
conclusion proved prescient, and has received increasing support in Europe. In the present 
paper, we provide a broadly parallel analysis for the United States, where research has been 
less targeted on this issue. We obtain rather positive results, reporting similar findings for the 
category of temporary workers in the United States as found for fixed-term contract workers 
in Britain.  
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I. Introduction 
Atypical work, as its name implies, has often been looked upon with disfavour by economists 
on both sides of the Atlantic in terms of the remuneration and career possibilities attaching to 
temporary work of this nature. Indeed, in their introduction to an Economic Journal (EJ) 
Symposium on temporary jobs, Booth, Dolado, and Frank (2002) summarize the thrust of the 
contributions as suggesting that the expansion of temporary jobs as a way of increasing 
labour market flexibility may be undesirable. Yet in analysing the British evidence, these 
authors temper this judgment with evidence that fixed-term contracts – if not seasonal and 
casual jobs (the other temporary work category they examine) – do provide a stepping stone 
to regular employment and imply no long-term wage disadvantage for women who start off 
their careers in this way. 
Since the Symposium, the stepping-stones counter argument has if anything gathered 
currency in Europe. That said, the shifting evidence did not dissuade the EU from passing the 
long-delayed third and ‘final’ piece of atypical worker legislation in November 2008 
covering agency temporary work.1 Under Directive 2008/104/EC, the basic working 
conditions of these temporary help supply/agency temporary workers are for the duration of 
their assignment at the user undertaking to be at least equal to those that would obtain had 
they been recruited directly into that job by the undertaking (Official Journal, 2008). This 
equal treatment principle is to apply from the first day of an assignment unless otherwise 
amended on the basis of agreement between organized labour and capital (so that the 
qualifying period is 12 weeks in the case of the United Kingdom).2 The Agency Workers 
Regulations became operational in Britain on October 1, 2011. The backdrop was a marked 
reduction in the stringency of employment protection regulations in the EU15 (especially 
Germany and Italy) between 1996 and 2008 in respect of atypical employment as a whole, as 
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well as a growth in the share of workers employed under fixed-term contracts and agency 
work contracts (see OECD, 2011; Jahn, Riphahn, and Schnabel, 2012:  F117-F118).  
 The present paper focuses on the impact of atypical work in the United States, where 
investigation of the phenomenon has rather tended to lag European research (see section II). 
By way of a cautionary note, European observers should resist the notion that interest in 
atypical work in the United States is necessarily undercut by that nation’s more limited 
employment protection architecture. For example, Autor (2003) reports evidence of a rapid 
growth in U.S. temporary employment – considerably outpacing overall employment – that is 
directly attributable to the attenuation of the common-law hire-at-will principle governing the 
employment relation. Specifically, he finds that the actions of state judiciaries in adopting the 
implied contract exception to the hire-at-will common-law doctrine – limiting the ability of 
employers to terminate workers and thereby exposing them to potentially costly litigation – 
explains a little over one-fifth of this job category’s remarkable employment growth between 
1973 and 1995 (see also Dertouzos, Holland, and Ebener, 1988; Dertouzos and Karoly, 1992, 
1993).  
Moreover, although contemporary information on the size of the atypical or 
contingent workforce in the United States is less than stellar, Table 1 assembles information 
from the 1995-2005 waves of the nationally representative Contingent and Alternative 
Employment Arrangement Supplement to the Current Population Survey (CAEAS) to 
illustrate the importance of the sector. (The main limitation of the CAEAS – unlike the 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, 1979 Cohort (NLSY79) used in the present exercise  
– is that it only allows one to follow individuals for a maximum of sixteen months.)3 In 
addition to the categories of temporary workers and contractors/consultants, the table adds 
on-call workers, that is, workers who are called to work only as needed although they can be 
scheduled to work for several weeks in a row. Evidently, at around 10 per cent, the share of 
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the workforce in atypical work arrangements is substantive and fairly similar to that reported 
by Booth, Francesconi, and Frank for the United Kingdom, albeit differing in composition.   
(Table 1 near here) 
At face value, the size of the U.S. contingent workforce has decreased modestly since 
the period covered by Autor’s study. This decline, however, might be temporary given recent 
pieces of legislation enacted in the United States that may have encouraged the substitution of 
atypical workers for regular workers. As reported by Surfield (2013), employers continue to 
respond to particular constraints on their ability to dismiss workers – here, failure to adopt 
right-to-work laws – by increasing their use of atypical workers. More recently, concerns 
have attached to the use of contractors by firms in the construction industry as a means of 
circumventing the payment of payroll taxes, workers’ compensation, and unemployment 
insurance (Goodwyn, 2013). We shall return to this theme in our concluding remarks, but 
would contend here that the role played by the atypical workforce in the United States is not 
inconsequential from either a policy perspective or with regards to the development of an 
employee’s employment and wage history. 
 In charting the consequences of atypical work in the Unites States, the present paper 
aims as far as possible to replicate Booth, Francesconi, and Frank’s (2002) wage and duration 
analysis (if not their evaluation of job satisfaction and training), and to provide a useful point 
of contact between the U.S. and European literatures regarding career prospects. So as to set 
the scene, it first reviews the former literature and then updates the state of play in European 
research since the 2002 Symposium. The main hypotheses underlying our analysis are next 
presented. Then, the unique dataset used in the empirical analysis is described and some facts 
of atypical employment assembled. There follows a cet. par. analysis of the employment and 
wage implications of atypical work. A summary and modestly broadened discussion 
concludes.  
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II. Literature Review 
Because of data constraints, much of the early U.S. literature focused on a single atypical 
work arrangement, namely temporary help supply/agency temporary employment (see Davis-
Blake and Uzzi, 1993; Parker, 1994; Segal and Sullivan, 1997).  It was reported that such 
jobs were typically of shorter duration than regular employment and were often poorly 
compensated as well.4  
One particular problem with the early studies was that employment transitions were 
identified on the basis of changes in industrial classification. Specifically, the researchers 
could only identify workers who self-reported holding employment in the temporary help 
agency industry, thence tracing their pathways out of this industry and into other branches 
such as manufacturing or other services. Left unclear was whether transitioning workers were 
moving into open-ended employment in the new industrial sectors or whether they were still 
temporary workers (although now without the assistance of a temporary help agency). Alone 
among the studies, Houseman and Polivka (2000) were able to examine worker transitions 
from a broad spectrum of atypical work forms in addition to agency temporaries – direct-hire 
temporaries, on-call workers, contract workers, and independent contractors – after an 
interval of one year. But, as was the case with earlier studies, these authors were unable to 
ascertain whether switches of employer were indicative of actual changes in the work 
arrangement (i.e. from atypical to regular employment) as opposed to switches into a 
different type of atypical work with a different employer or the same type of atypical work 
with a different employer (say a different temporary help agency). 
 More recent studies – added detail on which is contained in the Appendix – have been 
able to exploit administrative or longitudinal data in determining the implications of 
temporary employment for worker earnings profiles (Lane et al., 2003; Heinrich, Mueser, and 
Troske, 2005; Autor and Houseman, 2006; Hamersma and Heinrich, 2008; Andersson, 
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Holzer, and Lane, 2009; Heinrich, Mueser and Troske, 2009) or employment continuity 
(Autor and Houseman, 2010). The evidence they provide on the ability of atypical work to 
facilitate transitions into regular employment and promote earnings development is mixed. 
Some report generally positive implications associated with an earlier interlude of temporary 
employment (e.g. Andersson, Holzer, and Lane, 2009), with others uncovering some sharply 
negative effects (Lane et al., 2003; Autor and Houseman, 2010). Yet other studies find either 
no effect or an initial effect (typically unfavourable but sometimes favourable) that dissipates 
over time (Hamersma and Heinrich, 2008; Heinrich, Mueser, and Troske, 2005, 2009; Autor 
and Houseman, 2006).  
Such mixed evidence might be attributed to the very limited scope of the supporting 
data. Although unlike their precursors these studies are able to track changes in the 
employment arrangement, they typically focus on narrow slices of the workforce – low 
income types or a single contingent work group – or are restricted in their geographical reach. 
Partly in response to these limitations, we chose in the present inquiry to use the National 
Longitudinal Study of Youth, 1979 Cohort (see section IV).  
What of the European literature? The tenor of the material contained in the 
aforementioned EJ Symposium was frankly negative as regards the career prospects opened 
up by temporary work as a whole in Britain; in pointing to unfavourable spillover from the 
temporary sector to the permanent sector for France; in linking the growth of temporary work 
to adverse states of nature in Sweden; and in respect of the stubborn persistence of temporary 
employment once such working practices had become entrenched in the case of Spain.5 But 
since then the empirical evidence, while mixed, has proven much more favourable to 
temporary employment and to agency work in particular. Thus, evidence consistent with a 
stepping stones interpretation has been reported for atypical work (comprising fixed term 
contracts, temporary help supply/agency work, and on-call contracts – as well as subsidized 
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employment) in the Netherlands by Zijl, Heyma, and van den Berg (2011); for fixed-term 
contracts in Portugal by Portugal by Portugal and Varejão (2010); and for temporary help 
supply/agency work in Denmark, Spain, and (two regions of) Italy by Jahn and Rosholm 
(2010), García-Pérez, J.I., Muñoz-Bullón (2005), and Ichino, Mealli, and Nannicini (2005), 
respectively. 
And in the case of Germany, although there is little to suggest that temporary jobs 
lead to increased regular employment,6 there is some suggestion that temporary employment 
does no harm and in fact provides an access-to-work function (i.e. a reduced risk of future 
unemployment). Evidence to this effect is reported by Kvasnicka (2009) in the case of 
temporary help supply work and by Freier and Steiner (2008) for ‘marginal employment’, 
namely employment at low working hours and earnings not covered by social security. 
Nevertheless, there remains real concern in Europe over the (co)existence of two-tier 
labour markets – comprising regular open-ended contracts on the one hand and temporary 
employment contracts on the other – that are subject to different rules and restrictions. 
Modelling the interaction between these two sectors – involving the notion of an optimal 
share of flexible workers – received emphasis in a second EJ disquisition on the subject in 
2012 (see Jahn, Riphahn, and Schnabel, 2012) . A particular concern was the possibility that 
reforms creating or modifying two-tier labour markets might be second-best compared with 
modifications of regular contracts or reforms introducing a single labour contract (e.g. 
Bentolila et al., 2012). In sum, although the European empirical evidence has turned more 
positive of late as regards flexible work arrangements, recent theoretical developments have 
proven more pessimistic. 
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III. Preliminary Considerations  
In the most general (competitive market) sense, workers in temporary jobs should 
receive higher wages as a form of compensating advantage for the reduced constancy of 
employment. As a practical matter, however, such workers may receive lower wages because 
they have less firm-specific human capital, or are of lower average quality, or because 
efficiency wages play no role in this work arrangement. One obvious exception to this latter 
observation is the group of independent contractors and consultants (also examined in the 
present study), many of whom are professionals and who may actually command a premium 
because of the various savings they offer employers.  
These observations remind us that there are many types of atypical work as well as 
differences between individuals. In addition to the niche services of contractors/consultants, 
temporary work may be of a probationary nature (often influenced by employment protection 
legislation), or it may be used to replace permanent workers on leave, or it may take the form 
of fixed term contracts that serve as a buffer stock. For their part, individuals may be 
distinguished according to whether they entered into the temporary employment relation 
voluntarily or involuntarily. 
Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002: F191-193) first discuss temporary employment 
that is unlikely to transition into regular employment, namely, the buffer stock and 
replacement labour cases. Such jobs are not conducive to firm specific training for either side, 
but may nonetheless be attractive to those groups who have a lower probability of wishing to 
remain at the firm. Examples include women who are contemplating exiting into nonmarket 
activities and younger workers unsure of their career preferences. For workers who 
voluntarily sort into these jobs the long-term wage implications are expected to largely 
neutral.  
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But what of the case of temporary jobs that fulfil a probationary function. The 
implication is that individuals of lower expected ability will be hired into temporary jobs and 
individuals of higher expected ability hired into permanent jobs. The latter are deemed to 
have involuntarily sorted into fixed term contracts. More importantly, the greater the extent 
the sorting is on the basis of ability, the more permanent the wage penalty.  
For these authors, then, an important consideration is whether sorting into atypical 
work is voluntary or involuntary to begin with. Booth, Francesconi, and Frank further suggest 
that, since voluntary sorting, is more likely in the case of women than men, an initial 
temporary job is a better signal of low ability for men than for women. 
Since their data do not allow them to differentiate temporary help supply jobs from 
seasonal and casual work, Booth, Francesconi, and Frank pay little direct attention to such 
work arrangements. Recent research has indicated that temporary help supply firms may 
themselves provide general training to lower paid workers who lack certain skills but who 
have an aptitude for and interest in learning. This training in turn enables temporary help 
agencies to screen such workers and learn about their abilities (Autor, 2001).  Employers may 
use temporary help supply firms to screen workers and ultimately recruit them in permanent 
jobs.  Indeed, so important may be the screening role played by agencies that they may be 
used to acquire information on applicants for permanent jobs directly. The implication is that, 
while they may suffer some initial wage penalty, temporary help supply workers might see 
faster wage growth once they transition onto regular employment. Rather, Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank draw a distinction between seasonal and casual employment and 
other types of atypical work, arguing that it will be marked by an absence of human capital 
formation, be populated by low ability individuals and always pay less than permanent work, 
with incumbents possibly ‘cycling’ between short spells of employment and longer spells of 
unemployment or inactivity.7 
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An abbreviated set of hypotheses might therefore run as follows. Temporary work 
may attract a wage premium in competitive markets, and in circumstances where the work is 
professional in nature where individuals seeking high employment flexibility find it optimal 
to invest in general human capital. Voluntary choice of temporary work implies little in the 
way of a wage penalty, while involuntary choice broadly implies the reverse. But the latter 
situation is more nuanced by reason of the screening efficiencies of temporary help supply 
firms. Workers using temporary employment as a means of getting ‘a foot in the door’ may 
suffer an initial wage penalty in the probationary period but faster wage growth if the job 
converts into regular or open ended employment. Finally, transition rates into open-ended 
employment are expected to be lower for those who chose to engage in temporary work 
because of the increased employment flexibility offered by such jobs. In the case of 
involuntary choices, the situation is again more nuanced. If a temporary job was all that the 
individual could find, then such workers are going to encounter great difficulty in securing 
regular employment in the future. For those individuals seeking to demonstrate their worth to 
the firm, however, transition rates will be higher than for those who voluntarily choose such 
work – and very possibly higher than for those who opted to search off the job. 
 
IV. The Data   
The National Longitudinal Study of Youth (NLSY79) is a nationally representative sample of 
12,686 young men and women aged 14 to 22 years when they were first surveyed in 1979. 
Interviews were conducted annually through 1994 and on a biennial basis thereafter, covering 
a period of adolescence through middle age. A key feature of the NLSY79 is that it gathers 
information on labour force activity in an event history format. This information includes the 
beginning and end dates for each job held since the last interview, thereby facilitating the 
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measurement of actual labour market experience, tenure with a specific employer, and 
employer transitions.  
Although the main focus of the survey is upon labour force behaviour, the content of 
the NLSY79 ranges further afield. It thus contains questions on educational investments, 
marital and fertility histories, income and assets, health conditions and workplace injuries. 
Additional labour force information includes number of hours worked and earnings, as well 
as occupation, industry, and specific job characteristics. Furthermore, the NLSY79 includes 
an aptitude measure, namely the full Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery which was 
administered to 94.4 per cent of sample respondents in 1980 (see below).8  
For present purposes, the NLSY79 first began asking workers about their type of 
working arrangements in 1994. As in previous rounds, the 1994 wave also contains data on 
the current job identifier, as well as retrospective data on the last four jobs held up to that 
point. After 1994, the questions on working arrangement were continued biennially until the 
1998 wave, at which point they were discontinued.9 (Note that we can recoup the working 
arrangements between these three waves from data contained in the respondents’ work 
histories.)  
We extracted two datasets from the NLSY79. The first uses information from the 
1994, 1996, and 1998 surveys,10 including their retrospective content, to construct the 
pathways and durations of jobs and working arrangements held by respondents from 1992 
onwards. The second sample uses the 1993 to 1998 waves of the NLSY79 for the analysis of 
wage development. For this second sample, we do not go quite so far back in time given the 
progressive loss of data on both pay and work type prior to this wave of the NLSY79.11 
Using the NLSY79 we can identify two principal forms of the five commonly-
identified types of atypical work in the United States. These two forms are ‘temporary 
workers’ and ‘contractors/consultants’. The former category comprises the separate 
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categories of temporary help supply (or agency temporary) workers and direct-hire 
temporaries which we shall amalgamate on sample size grounds (see the justification below), 
while information on contractors and consultants is not separated out in the survey and is 
therefore a composite grouping to begin with.12 
 There is no information on ‘on-call workers’ (the final category of commonly 
identified atypical worker jobs – see Table 1) in the NLSY79. Nor for that matter, as was 
noted earlier, can we separate contractors from consultants. Information on on-call workers 
and contractors is available in the other main data set available to U.S. researchers – the 
Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangement Supplement (CAEAS) to the Current 
Population Survey – but use of this material is ruled out because, as was noted earlier, worker 
histories are only available for a maximum of sixteen months. 
Three further remarks regarding the atypical work arrangements identified in the 
NLSY79 are in order. First, our contractors/consultants grouping clearly differs from the 
British category of fixed-term contracts – defined as “job(s) done under contract or for a 
fixed period of time” – used in Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002). In European parlance, 
contract workers are those who are typically hired under contract or for a fixed term. In our 
case, workers engaged in contracting/consulting work are hired for a specific reason, if not 
for a specific term. The reason might be developing a software code in the case of contractors 
or providing compliance advice with respect to a legal mandate in the case of consultants.13 
Contractors/consultants are likely to considerably more skilled than British category of  
fixed-term contract workers. 
Second, our temporary worker classification – to repeat, a conflation of agency 
temporaries and direct-hire temporaries – will on the other hand resemble Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank’s other temporary work category of seasonal and casual work 
(formally “a seasonal, temporary, or casual job”) to the extent that either type of worker is 
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used to meet cyclical product demand or deployed in substitution for absent regular 
employees. And the link is presumably closer for those are identified as ‘temporary’ in the 
British definition. As a practical matter, however, there may be even closer overlap between 
our category of temporary workers and fixed-term contract workers in Booth, Francesconi, 
and Frank. The bottom line is that the category of temporary workers on a U.S. definition is 
probably much closer in fit to the two separate categories used by Booth, Francesconi, and 
Frank than that between contractors/consultants and workers employed under fixed-term 
contracts.  
Finally, returning to the issue of our conflation of the agency workers and direct-hire 
temps, other research indicates this is unlikely to be a cause for concern. The primary motive 
for aggregating agency and direct-hire temporaries into a single composite category was the 
practical one of sample size. But Addison and Surfield (2009) provide formal support for this 
aggregation, using the larger sample contained within the Current Population 
Survey/CAEAS. They report that the employment continuity implications of the two forms of 
temporary work are not significantly different. Major differences in employment outcomes 
are reserved for employees in temporary employment on the one hand and 
contractors/consultants on the other.  
Returning to the present exercise, using our first set of data extracted from the 
NLSY79 we are able to trace the pathways used by workers engaged in atypical work over 
the interval 1992–1998 (see above). That is, using the three main surveys and their 
retrospective elements, we can identify the sequence of jobs and the associated work 
arrangements held by workers over this not inconsiderable period. This sequencing provides 
us with some guidance as to whether or not temporary employment serves as a potential 
stepping stone into regular employment, and of the employee characteristics that underpin 
such transitions. We are able to determine, for example, whether an interval of temporary 
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employment ends with another spell of similar employment or if the subsequent job taken is 
open-ended employment. For each job held by workers, we identify its industrial and 
occupational affiliation, the size of the employment unit, and a measure of working hours 
(part-time or full-time). This job information is supplemented with data on the demographic 
and other characteristics of the worker (e.g. age, education, region, race/ethnicity, etc.) at the 
time of each NLSY interview to estimate their potential impact on job transitions.14  
We can also investigate the medium-term implications of temporary and contract 
work on a worker’s wages with the second set of data culled from the NLSY79. Like Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank, we are able to identify the total number of temporary and contracting 
jobs held by a worker – in our case, over 1993–1998. But we also seek to improve upon this 
measure by recording the number of years spent in either type of atypical employment on the 
grounds that worker remuneration is more likely to be impacted by a prolonged period of 
time spent in an atypical job – and, in particular, temporary employment – than by the 
frequency of such jobs.  
  The wage data pertain to the primary job held by a respondent at the time of each 
NLSY interview. Note further that we included those temporary or contracting jobs starting 
and ending between any two waves in our measure of the time spent in atypical work. But for 
reasons of temporal consistency the wages of such jobs were not used in our wage analysis.15 
 For both samples extracted from the NLSY79, we also assemble information on the 
total amount of general labour market experience accrued by a worker since 1975 as a 
measure of accumulated general human capital and examine its implications for wage 
development and job transitions. We also constructed proxies for a worker’s ability using the 
Armed Forces Qualification Test (AFQT), comprising four sections from the Armed Services 
Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) and reported in the 1981 NLSY. Specifically, proxies 
for a worker’s mathematical, verbal, practical and scientific ability were constructed by using 
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the test results for these general areas and then recouping the residuals obtained from the 
regression of scores on a vector of age and education dummies.16 
 
V. A Picture of Temporary Work 
We preface our cet. par. analysis with descriptive information on the types of workers filling 
atypical jobs, their distribution and remuneration, and their job durations and pathways, in 
each case juxtaposed against corresponding information on those in regular or traditional 
open-ended employment. Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on atypical workers by 
individual and job characteristics, AFQT scores, location, industry, and broad occupational 
affiliation. As can be seen, there are significant differences in the types of workers who are 
filling regular jobs relative to their atypical counterparts. Both contractors/consultants and 
temporary workers are likely to be younger and work part-time relative to those engaged in 
open-ended employment. As also reported by Cohany (1998), temporary workers are more 
likely to be a minority members, have lower educational attainments and less likely to be 
married when compared to regular workers – and conversely for contractors/consultants. We 
observe a similar pattern for AFQT test scores (see also below). That is to say, temporary 
(contractors/consultants) fare poorly (favourably) when compared to regular workers. 
(Table 2 near here) 
In terms of their industrial and occupational characteristics, contractors/consultants 
are more likely to be engaged in agriculture, construction and mining, and business services 
than regular workers. For their part, temporary workers are disproportionately employed in 
business services, while under-represented in construction and mining, retail and wholesale 
trade, finance, insurance and real estate, as well as professional services. Finally, 
contractors/consultants are more likely to be found employed as managers or technical/sales 
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workers vis-à-vis regular workers, while temporary workers are more concentrated amongst 
the ranks of clerical workers and operators/labourers.  
Descriptive information on the distribution of work arrangements and hourly 
remuneration are given in Table 3. Somewhat more than 12,700 jobs were recorded by the 
NLSY79 respondents over the period 1993-1998. From panel (a) of the table it can be seen 
that approximately 6 per cent of all jobs held were temporary, whereas contracting or 
consulting positions accounted for less than 2 per cent of the total. Note that, while our 
NLSY79 data have approximately the same proportion of temporary jobs as was observed in 
the Current Population Survey tabulations, we see a significantly lower proportion of workers 
engaged in contracting/consulting work (see Cohany, 1998: Table 1). The under-
representation of contractors/consultants in the NLSY79 data likely reflects the survey’s 
oversampling of the economically disadvantaged and minorities.  
(Table 3 near here) 
Panel (b) of Table 3 presents information on the inflation-adjusted average hourly 
wages of the three groups, while panel (c) provides t-tests of the respective wage differences. 
Temporary workers appear to fare poorly relative to those employed in either regular work or 
contracting/consulting. The $4.82 differential reported for the whole sample represents a 45 
per cent wage disparity between regular and temporary work, and captures the much greater 
earnings penalty applying in the case of men than women. All wage differences between 
temporary and regular workers (and contracting/consulting workers) are statistically 
significant. When we compare contracting/consulting workers with regular workers, 
however, the broad earnings picture is reversed, although only in the case of females is the 
now favourable earnings gap (of almost $4) statistically significant. 
(Table 4 and Figure 1 near here) 
16 
 
Finally, Table 4 presents information on job durations (panel (a)) and job pathways 
(panel (b)) over the 1992 to 1998 waves of NLSY79 data for workers as a whole,17 with data 
from the 2000 wave being used to update the former information. Kaplan-Meier estimates of 
both completed and incomplete durations of the various work arrangements are given in 
Figure 1 and reveal that fully fifty per cent of temporary jobs are completed within six 
months. From the table we see that the median duration for contracting/consulting work is, at 
1.71 years, more than twice that of temporary employment. Regular open-ended jobs had a 
median duration of just under three years. Only three per cent of temporary jobs lasted more 
than five years as compared with almost 40 per cent in the case of regular jobs. 
As for the pathways, slightly more than one-half of temporary and 
contracting/consulting workers remained in the same work arrangement over the sample 
period. Unsurprisingly, of those who transitioned out of either atypical work arrangement, 
regular employment rather than another form of atypical work was the preferred path: 48 per 
cent of temporary workers and 44 per cent of contractors/consultants subsequently entered 
open-ended employment. The transition rates out of regular work show that this is a highly 
stable work arrangement: more than 96 per cent of all those initially in regular employment 
either took another regular job or remained in the same job across all seven years of the 
sample period.18 
 
VI. Temporary Employment and Career Prospects: Transitions, Wage Gaps, and 
Selection Issues 
We next present the cet. par. evidence on transitions and wage development.  A brief caveat 
is required in respect of transitions out of contracting/consulting work into regular 
employment. Although it is the case that similar proportions of contractors/consultants and 
temporary workers transition into regular work, the smaller absolute number of 
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contractor/consultant transitions (which becomes acute when we disaggregate by gender) 
rules out a parallel analysis for this group. For the wage analyses, since we use the whole 
sample (of contractors/consultants) and not just those who eventually secure an open-ended 
job, this problem recedes. Accordingly, our analysis of wage gaps between regular and 
atypical work is presented for both groups and not just temporary workers.  
(a) Exit from Temporary Agency Work to Regular Work  
We have seen that around one-half of atypical workers transition into permanent 
employment. But what type of workers are they? To address this issue, we specify a discrete 
time Cox proportional hazard model in the manner of Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (see 
their Table 5: F203–205) linking transitions into open-ended employment to a number of 
individual attributes, including AFQT scores and job specific characteristics. This analysis 
focuses on workers who changed jobs during the sample time period from temporary work to 
regular permanent work.  Our hazard model is defined as: 
(1)   H(t|X) = H0(t) * exp(1X1 + 2X2 + ... + kXk) 
where H(t|X) is the hazard of transition into a permanent work arrangement given at time t; 
X1 ... Xk are predictor variables; and H0(t) is the baseline hazard at time t, which represents 
the hazard for a worker with the value 0 for all the predictor variables. It provides significant 
strength to this empirical approach, as it corrects for baseline differences between workers 
that might influence the likelihood of transition over time. Specifically, the Cox proportional 
hazard regression model produces an adjusted hazard ratio that takes into account any 
baseline differences between workers that may have influenced the choice or ability to 
transition and are not captured in the predictor variables. Within this hazard analysis 
framework, the goal is to capture the factors that lead to permanent work. In this context, a 
worker is included in the analysis up to the point that he or she transitions to a permanent 
work arrangement.  Once a transition occurs, from that point on that worker is no longer 
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included as part of the “at-risk” set. Although the covariates are not identical between our two 
studies, the results make sense in general and are relatively consistent. We note 
parenthetically that estimation was also performed with gamma-distributed latent random 
effects in order to capture unobserved heterogeneity between individuals. Since the gamma 
variance parameter converged to zero, results of this procedure are not reported here, but are 
available upon request. 
(Table 5 near here) 
Our findings are reported in full in Table 5. From the table, we see that age – here a 
continuous rather than a categorical variable – is strongly negatively associated with 
transitions into open-ended employment and for both genders (whereas this is the case for 
males alone in Britain). The coefficient estimate for schooling – again a continuous rather 
than a categorical variable here – is positive throughout. That said, it is not statistically 
significant for females. Interestingly, black male temporary workers have a greater 
probability of exiting into regular employment than their (non-Hispanic) white counterparts 
whereas the opposite is true for Hispanics of both genders, even if this latter result is only 
marginally significant for females. The incorporation of AFQT scores is somewhat 
disappointing. Although higher verbal ability improves the chances of exiting from temporary 
work into regular employment for females, this is not true for males for whom the coefficient 
estimate is negative albeit statistically insignificant. For its part, practical ability appears to 
detract from transitioning into regular employment for females.  
Unlike the British case, part-time status has no adverse effect on transition rates. Nor 
for that matter is employer size related to transitions into regular employment, which might 
suggest that it is not only large employers that use temporary employment as a screen. The 
contribution of industrial affiliation is statistically insignificant throughout with the one 
exception of the personal services sector. Males in this sector are less likely to transition into 
19 
 
regular employment. Interestingly, Booth, Francesconi, and Frank obtain the same result for 
the ‘protection and personal services’ occupation in respect of seasonal and casual (if not 
fixed-term) work. Finally, none of our occupational coefficients proved statistically 
significant. 
(b) The Impact of Temporary and Contract Work Spells 
To what extent do the large wage gaps between regular, open-ended employment and 
atypical work observed for males and females, but especially for the former, reflect 
differential human capital endowments and the like? In Table 6 we report simple OLS 
regressions to measure the effects of such factors on log wages. Our regressors include those 
used earlier in modeling (temporary) worker transitions into regular employment. They are 
augmented in the manner of Booth Francesconi, and Frank, to include labour market 
experience. The authors of the British study measure experience over their survey period, 
1991-1997, whereas we measure it as time spent in employment since 1976. We think this 
more accurately captures a worker’s true workforce experience, and therefore provides a 
better reflection of how experience impacts wages. Following Booth, Francesconi, and Frank 
we also include a quadratic in the number of previous jobs held – that is, the number of 
temporary jobs and the number of contracting/consulting jobs – as well as interactions 
between each and lifetime experience to determine whether the returns to experience differ 
by contract type. Also, as the same individuals appear multiple times, the standard errors are 
clustered at the individual level so as to take into consideration any correlation in the error 
term over time by individuals. Lastly, we recognize that a number of regressors in our wage 
equation are potentially correlated with unobserved individual and job-specific 
characteristics. Unfortunately, given insufficient variation in the number of jobs held by 
respondents, we were unable to fully instrument for potentially endogenous variables in the 
manner of Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (see their IV/GLS estimates in Table 6: F209).  
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(Table 6 near here) 
Table 6 presents summary findings from our wage regressions.19 The basic result, 
after controlling for human capital, observed ability, and demographic, industrial and 
occupational differences, is that atypical work appears to have few adverse implications for 
female earnings over the 1993-1998 interval, while seemingly impacting male earnings 
unfavourably.  
 Focusing on the separate findings for males and females, and beginning with the 
results in the third column of the table, we see that the first temporary job held by males 
serves to reduce wages, by 16.6 per cent (exp[-0.230 + 0.049] - 1 = -16.6) when compared to 
those males who never held a temporary job. The coefficient estimate for the squared term 
suggests that this gap falls with the number of jobs taken over the six-year interval. At the 
margin, each additional temporary job held by a male serves to reduce his earnings by an 
additional 12.4 per cent on average (exp[-0.230 + 2(0.049)] - 1 = -0.124).  Observe that the 
estimated cet. par. differential is around one-half that of the crude wage gap earlier reported 
in Table 1, suggesting that a good portion of the wage disadvantage for males in temporary 
employment can be attributed to other observed characteristics. There are seemingly modest 
differences between the wages of males employed in contracting/consulting work and those 
of their counterparts in regular employment. Finally, there is the general result that additional 
years of general labour market experience have positive implications for wage development: 
each year of additional lifetime experience increases earnings by 5.4 per cent. 
 The results presented in the next column of the table look beyond the latter finding in 
providing estimates of any differential effect of atypical work on experience capital. Given 
the transitory nature of temporary jobs, it might not be unexpected to see a lesser return vis-à-
vis open-ended employment. Coefficient estimates of the interaction terms imply that a male 
worker with one year of lifetime experience would receive a wage penalty from one 
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temporary job over the first six years of a career of 22.2 per cent (exp[-0.313 + 0.044 + 0.019 
-0.001] - 1 = -0.220).  This falls to 15.2 per cent with ten years’ experience. For male 
contracting/consulting workers, the corresponding values are a premium of 31.6 per cent, 
falling to a slight penalty of 4.1 per cent. This said, these estimates are only jointly significant 
(p-value=0.000), so strong inference is inappropriate.  
In the case of females, as can be seen in the fifth column of the table, taking one 
temporary job over the first six years of a career implies a negative wage premium of 6.6 per 
cent, with this wage penalty increasing in the number of temporary jobs taken. Each 
additional temporary job taken by females serves to decrease their wages by an additional 6.9 
per cent on average. There appears to be little evidence that taking a contracting job 
significantly influences a female’s log wages. Although somewhat diminished in magnitude 
vis-à-vis males, observe that females also garner a wage premium for each year of prior 
labour market experience. The results presented in the sixth and last column of the table 
would imply that only experience interacted with the number of temporary jobs held is of 
importance, but again the estimates are only jointly statistically significant (p-value=0.002). 
If accepted at face value, however, taking a temporary job initially results in a discounted 
return to labour market experience that is heightened over time. In sum, it would appear that 
temporary employment holds a marginally deleterious effect on female wage development 
while contract work seemingly holds no effect.  
In contrast, the results presented by Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002) indicate 
that the wage penalty associated with a seasonal-casual job (to include ‘a temporary job’) 
actually increased for both genders with additional years of full-time experience.  In the case 
of British men, for example, the wage penalty for one year of full-time experience and a 
seasonal-casual job is stated to be approximately 11.5 per cent. After completing ten years of 
full-time experience, the penalty associated with a single seasonal-casual job increased to 
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12.3 per cent. For British females, the wage penalty was 4.5 per cent for one year of 
experience, almost doubling to 8.8 per cent with the accrual of ten years’ experience.  
This being said, the results are much closer for the category of fixed-term contracts. 
For British workers taking up such work arrangements, the wage gap between them and their 
counterparts in open-ended work actually decreased with additional full-time experience. The 
initial wage penalty for male and females working under a fixed-term contract was estimated 
at some 8.5 and 4.7 per cent, respectively. After ten years of full-time experience, however, 
this penalty decreased to 5 and 0.4 per cent for men and women respectively.   
In focusing on the number of atypical jobs held by a worker to derive the above 
results, we are not accounting directly for the actual time spent in such work arrangements. 
As an extreme example, consider two workers one of whom takes a temporary job as a 
(certain) stepping stone into regular employment while the other spends the entire six-year 
period in the same temporary job. Both workers will record only one temporary job, but it 
seems unlikely that this would have the same effect on each worker’s earnings. To investigate 
this issue, we further exploited the work diaries maintained by the NLSY79 respondents to 
derive a measure of the number of years spent in each type of atypical employment. We then 
substituted this measure for the number of jobs variable(s) previously used in Table 6. 
Summary findings of our re-estimations using the new argument(s) are contained in Table 7. 
(Table 7 near here) 
As was the case in Table 6, spending time in temporary employment is more 
detrimental for males. The results obtained in the third column of Table 7 indicate that a male 
who spent just one year in temporary work reduced his earnings by 14.1 per cent, although 
the coefficient estimate for the squared term again suggests that there is some mitigation of 
this wage penalty over the employment interval. At the margin, each additional year spent in 
temporary employment serves to reduce a male’s wage by an additional 12.8 per cent on 
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average. For females, the results given in the fifth column of the table indicate that temporary 
employment plays even less of a role than before in the determination of their earnings once 
other observed differences are taken into account.  
If we hold experience constant and focus on the results in the fourth and sixth 
columns of the table, however, we can see that the cost of working as a temporary worker for 
one year results in a continuing penalty for both genders (although the results are not 
significant for females). For males, the penalty is 21.3 per cent after a year falling modestly 
to 14.6 per cent after ten years. But for females the implied wage effect is a penalty of just 3.1 
per cent after one year of lifetime experience that turns into a slight wage premium of 2.2 per 
cent after ten years. There is no such continuing penalty in the case of one year’s employment 
in contracting/consulting job; for males, there is actually a premium (of 27.9 per cent after 
one year falling to 4.9 per cent after ten years), while for females there is again even some 
suggestion of a penalty morphing into a modest premium (from -13.4 per cent after one year 
to 1.8 per cent after ten years).  
 (Figures 2 and 3 near here)  
The effects of different contract types on wages can be explored diagrammatically by 
describing wage paths for a number of career choices. Using the full results for the 
specifications summarized in columns 4 and 6 of Tables 6 and 7, we construct four such 
synthetic profiles for males and females. Profile 1 describes the case where the worker is 
employed in a permanent job throughout the sample period. Profile 2 (3) depicts a situation in 
which the worker holds a temporary (contracting/consulting) job in the first period, followed 
by employment in a permanent job therereafter. Finally, profile 4 is the case where the 
worker holds three temporary jobs before transitioning into permanent employment. These 
wage trajectories are reproduced in Figures 2 and 3, respectively. 
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Beginning with the specification based on the number of atypical jobs (see columns 4 
and 6 of Table 6), it is apparent from Figure 2 that male contracting and consulting workers 
are a cut above the rest and conversely for their counterparts in temporary jobs. That is, 
workers who take either one or three temporary jobs before transitioning into regular open-
ended employment earn less and continue to earn less than their counterparts in continuous 
regular employment, the gap between them narrowing only very slowly over time. It is as if 
the number of temporary jobs directly proxies unobserved differences in ability. As far as 
male consulting/contracting jobs are concerned, no earnings benefit accrues to switching out 
of this type of atypical work into regular employment since the earnings gap favouring 
former contracting/consulting workers narrows through time although it certainly persists 
over the time frame considered in the figure. 
The picture for women is somewhat different. Most obviously, the structure is much 
less dispersed and the gaps between profiles less pronounced. Points of contact with the male 
trajectories are, first, that former contracting/consulting workers continue to earn the most, 
although the gap between them and regular workers narrows, and, second, that those with 
three temporary jobs before they transition into regular employment continue to earn 
distinctly less than regular workers and actually deteriorate relatively. The main difference, 
then, is that those with one temporary job who transition into regular employment seemingly 
earn more than ever-regular workers to begin with but are subsequently overtaken by them. 
That said, the earnings gaps in question are very modest. With the possible exception of 
profile 4 types, there is little to suggest in the female case that number of temporary jobs 
might proxy unobserved heterogeneity. 
Figure 3 replaces the number of jobs (see columns 4 and 6 of Table 7) measure with 
time spent in atypical jobs, so that Profile 1 corresponds to the situation where zero years are 
spent in atypical employment, Profile 2 denotes the situation where one year is spent in 
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temporary work, and so on. The earnings profiles shown for males fairly closely follow those 
reported earlier in Figure 2. That is to say, there is no indication that switching out of 
temporary work into regular work is associated with catch-up, while the earnings advantage 
of former consulting/contracting workers is now subject to less erosion. As far as females are 
concerned, however, there is much stronger evidence of catch-up in the wake of transitions 
following one or three years in temporary jobs into regular employment. And for this 
specification, those transitioning from contracting/consulting work display the sharpest 
earnings progression of all.  
(c) Propensity Score Matching 
Lastly, we recognize that our identification strategy in Tables 6 and 7 is predicated on 
the assumption that the control variables make individuals who had temporary work 
arrangements (the implied treatment group) comparable to those who did not have similar 
employment experiences (the implied control group).  Although we control for many 
demographic, human capital, and employment-related characteristics of the observed 
workers, selection bias may still be a concern. Specifically, workers have some choice over 
the jobs they accept, which potentially invalidates our quasi-experimental design, as the 
treatment and control groups may not be well matched. We address this potential problem by 
using propensity score matching (PSM) analysis.  
(Table 8 near here) 
A propensity score is an individual specific predicted probability of having selected 
into a temporary or contract work arrangement. We obtain these scores by estimating a 
logistic regression wherein the temporary or contract work variables serve as the dependent 
variable in each analysis, respectively.  All available covariates from the primary analysis 
were utilized as each, theoretically, may influence the probability of a temporary or contract 
work outcome. Results of the logistic scoring model are presented in Table 8 and indicate that 
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older workers, Hispanics, and married individuals, are less likely on average to engage in 
temporary work. Conversely, we see that age and race play no meaningful role for contract 
workers, although education is now an important determinant. There are also differences 
between the two atypical work groups by location, workers from the Northeast and South 
being less likely to engage in temporary work than their counterparts from the North Central 
region, although the exact opposite pattern applies for contractors. Lastly, while there is little 
evidence of differences between workers with temporary and standard work arrangements in  
terms of skills, as measured by the AFQT, some difference are apparent when considering 
contractors/consultants; specifically, while demonstrating  lower coding skills, this group 
performs significantly higher on the practical ability section of the test.  
With the propensity scores computed, respondents from each group are now matched 
using the propensity scores for each respective PSM analysis. To perform these PSM 
analyses we use the standard “nearest neighbour within calliper” approach, which matches 
workers having propensity scores within plus or minus 1 per cent of each other (see, for 
example, Oakes and Johnson 2006). In our case, a calliper of 1 per cent results in 5.69 per 
cent unmatched observations (using replacement) in the temporary worker analysis and only 
2.45 per cent unmatched observations (using replacement) in the contract worker analysis. 
These results imply a strong match based on included observable characteristics in each 
case.20  
Next we assess the underlying covariate balance, which helps identify the bias caused 
by off-support estimation. The “common support” criterion is gauged by using standardized 
differences for each covariate included in the logistic regression to calculate the per cent bias 
for each covariate. Ideally, each standardized per cent bias would be less than 10 per cent 
after matching. There is little cause for concern over covariate imbalance in respect of either 
atypical work arrangement; specifically, all of the covariates in the temporary work analysis 
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and over 96 per cent of them in the contractors/consultants case fell within the 10 per cent 
window after matching.  Moreover, in each case, the average per cent bias across the 
covariates was less than 5 per cent, and none of the variables exhibited a statistically 
significant difference between the treatment and control groups, indicating a very strong 
covariate balance and common support structure. Details of the test for covariate imbalance 
are provided in Table A.2.  
Having completed the matching and covariate balancing, we are in a position to 
perform the desired PSM estimation. The average treatment difference of exposure to a 
temporary work position on log wages between the treatment and control groups equals -
0.1807 (bootstrap standard error = 0.0283). Hence, these PSM results are consistent with the 
inference taken from the estimates presented in Tables 6 and 7, suggesting that selection bias 
between temporary work arrangements and wages is not a material concern once observables 
are accounted for in the model. The PSM results for contract workers are similar to those 
shown in Tables 6 and 7, the estimates now illustrating no statistically significant average 
treatment effect of contract work exposure on wages (p=0.719). 
 
VII. Conclusions 
Reflecting data considerations, there has been rather less investigation of the nature and 
consequences of atypical work in the United States than in Europe. Of late, this imbalance 
has if anything grown. Partly for this reason, the extant U.S. evidence on the implications of 
atypical work for employment continuity and wages is also more polarized, with some 
observers continuing to characterize atypical work as providing dead end jobs with poor 
wages and prospects (particularly for welfare clients) and others seeing them more as 
stepping stones to permanent or at least regular employment. The caveat in all of this is of 
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course that some atypical jobs in the United States have always been regarded as well-paying, 
even offering a premium over regular, open-ended employment.  
In the present treatment we have sought to offer a fresh view of the U.S. evidence by 
examining job transitions and wage development for two atypical jobs at either end of the 
wage continuum: temporary workers, comprising agency and direct hire temps, and 
consulting/contracting workers. In this endeavour we have drawn directly on Booth, 
Francesconi, and Frank’s (2002) important study of workers on fixed-term contracts and 
those in casual and seasonal jobs. Although we are unable to investigate the job satisfaction 
enjoyed by temporary workers (or examine their training opportunities as do these authors), 
we can broadly replicate their treatment of the effects of temporary work on career prospects 
subject to the limitations of the U.S. data. Moreover, we recognize that a number of 
regressors in our wage equation are potentially correlated with unobserved individual and 
job-specific characteristics, so that the potential for some endogeneity exists. This limitation 
needs to be kept in mind when interpreting our analysis of wage dynamics. That said, the 
results of the propensity score analysis do help to alleviate concerns that selection bias has 
dramatically invalidated identification or confounded our estimates.  
Subject to these caveats, we report suggestive and detailed results that provide a real 
measure of support for Booth, Francesconi, and Frank with respect to our admittedly 
somewhat different category of temporary workers, while at the same time confirming past 
(U.S.) research on the more privileged position of contracting/consulting workers. That is to 
say, on the negative side we find that male temps suffer a material cet. par. wage 
disadvantage that persists with only very slight sign of narrowing after the transition into 
regular work. More positively, however, the situation confronting female temporary workers 
is much brighter, also in line with Booth, Francesconi, and Frank, at least for our preferred 
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measure of time spent in atypical work. The difference in our case is that there is less 
evidence of a wage penalty to begin with.  
At a descriptive level, temporary jobs are indeed stepping stones to regular 
employment. Males who enter regular employment after one or more spells of temporary 
work close the gap, although at a very slow rate. For females, on the other hand, any earnings 
gap associated with taking temporary jobs before entering regular employment is modest to 
begin with and narrows over time. More work is clearly required in evaluating the stepping 
stone function of atypical work for the unemployed using standard administered social 
experiment techniques. 
Despite the advantages of temporary jobs as stepping stones to regular employment, 
especially in an economy emerging from a period of major recession, expansion of temporary 
work as a means of increasing labour market flexibility comes at a cost. As reported by 
ourselves and by Booth, Francesconi, and Frank that cost may be transitory. But there are 
some worrying elements of atypical work exposed in the Economic Journal Symposium on 
temporary jobs, one aspect of which is also hinted at in the recent U.S. experience with 
contractors, a seemingly favoured group. We refer here to emerging evidence from the 
construction industry in Texas of the use of this work arrangement to avoid the payment of 
workman’s compensation, payroll taxes, unemployment taxes, and overtime (see Goodwyn, 
2013). Reclassifying employees as independent contractors can lead to a race to the bottom 
and destabilize labour markets, aggravated by a U.S. context of undocumented labour. In 
short, a proper accounting for the effects of atypical jobs is not independent of institutional 
and economic context. Our treatment has perforce largely abstracted from the wider 
institutional context, while being limited to the decade of the 1990s. For both reasons, the 
recent programme changes to the Federal budget to add an Annual Current Population Survey 
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Supplement (see footnote 3) that will enhance the capability of the BLS to produce data on 
contingent work and alternative work arrangements can only be applauded.   
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Footnotes 
 
1. Atypical worker directives dealing with part-timers, fixed-term contract workers, and 
agency temps were first mooted in the early 1980s but draft legislation covering the first two 
groups was not enacted into law until in the late 1990s (see Official Journal, 1998, 1999, 
respectively). Legislation on agency workers has proved altogether more controversial given 
the diversity of law and custom practice within the EU. Thus, for example, the present 
legislation was first proposed by the Commission in 2002. Final passage of the draft 
legislation some six years later hinged on a mix of external and internal concessions. The 
former included British opt-outs on yet more controversial legislation in the form of the 
ultimately abortive working hours’ directive. Among the internal concessions, apart from the 
derogation noted in the text, was the exemption from equal treatment in respect of pay where 
agency temps having a permanent employment contract with their agency continued to be 
paid between assignments.   
2. By the same token, member states are to review existing restrictions or prohibitions of the 
use of temporary agency workers – presumably including limits on the sectors or special 
situations in which temporary agency workers can be used or on the maximum duration of 
assignments – in order to verify that they are justified on grounds of health and safety ‘or the 
need to ensure that the labour market functions properly and abuses are prevented.’ Note that 
these provisions, however, do not cover national requirements on the registration, licensing, 
certification, financial guarantees or monitoring of temporary work agencies. 
3. On February 12, 2012, the President submitted his 2013 budget to Congress. The budget 
provides additional funding to the Bureau of Labour Statistics (BLS) that will result in 
improved information on atypical or contingent work. The BLS will add an Annual Current 
Population Survey Supplement to produce data on these work arrangements. Specifically, in 
even years, a Contingent Work Supplement will be conducted. 
4. A review of the U.S. atypical worker wage and employment literature, is contained in 
Addison and Surfield (2007, 2009). 
5. See, respectively, Booth, Francesconi, and Frank (2002); Blanchard and Landier (2002); 
Holmlund and Storrie (2002); and Dolado, García-Serrano and Jimeno (2002). 
6. The exception is a German-language study by Almus et al. (1999), of non-profit temporary 
help supply firms subsidized by the central labour agency to facilitate the re-employment of 
unemployed job seekers. Exposure to agency work was found to materially improve the 
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employment prospects outside atypical work of the treatment group vis-à-vis the control 
group of unemployed individuals. 
7. As before, these consequences are held to be different in the case of high-ability women 
and, we might add, contractors/consultants. 
8. There is also a school survey and high school transcript information. For further 
information on its content, the reader is referred to the NLSY79 website at 
http://www.bls.gov/nls/nlsy79.htm or to the NLSY79 Users’ Guide (Bureau of Labour 
Statistics) at http://www.bls.gov/nls/79guide/2001/nls79g0.pdf. 
9. Although questions on employment arrangement were added back into the survey in 2002, 
this information is not comparable with that contained in the 1994–1998 waves.  
10. In addition, although information on employment arrangement is not available on jobs 
started after 1998, we are able to use data from the 2000 wave to update the durations of such 
jobs held by respondents in 1998; see Table 3.  
11. However, we can go a little further back in the case of our first sample because of its 
focus on jobs rather than wages.  
12. Another potential group of atypical workers, termed ‘other work types’, can also be 
identified in the survey. Since members of this group are disproportionately individuals who 
identify themselves as self-employed – primarily, small business owners – we chose to 
exclude them. 
13. Observe that Polivka's (1996) tabulations using the CAEAS indicate that eighty-five per 
cent of contractors/consultants identified themselves as being self-employed, while only one-
half of the self-employed identified themselves as contractors/consultants. These tabulations 
suggest that self-employment itself is not a precondition for being classified into this atypical 
work form. 
14. For those spells of employment whose durations are completely contained between waves 
we take the worker characteristics recorded in the earlier survey. 
15. The retrospective data in the NLSY79 do allow us to identify the wage rate of jobs whose 
beginning and end dates fall completely within the time span between two successive 
surveys. For example, those jobs which started after the 1994 interview, but ended prior to 
the 1996 interview would have had their wage data collected retrospectively in 1996. 
However, a worker’s wage data for 1995 would not be reported if he/she had held the job 
continuously between 1994 and 1996. Accordingly, we excised the wage data for the 
minority of jobs whose employment fell between 1994 and 1996 and 1996 and 1998. 
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Tabulations of the 1994 to 1996 data, for example, suggest that approximately five per cent 
of jobs were excised due to this restriction.  
16. Education dummies, rather than the continuous variable, were used to allow for any 
nonlinearities in the effects of the variable on a worker’s AFQT score. 
17. There are only minor differences by gender, as demonstrated in Table A.1. 
18. It might appear that the column totals in panels (a) and (b) are inconsistent. In fact, the 
number of jobs used to derive the tabulations of durations (in panel (a)) and transitions (in 
panel (b)) are the same (viz. 12,743 jobs). The difference between the two panels resides in 
relative transitions out of the work arrangements – predominately out of atypical work and 
into open-ended employment – whereas regular workers are apt to start and remain as such. 
19. All covariates included in Table 5 are also included in the wage regressions of Tables 6 
and 7, but, as findings are consistent with expectations, they are not separately displayed. 
20. The characteristics included are the same as those employed in the wage analysis in 
Tables 6 and 7.  
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Table 1 
 
Estimates of the Size of the Contingent Labour Force in the United States, 1995 – 2005. 
 
 1995 1997 1999 2001 2005 
 
Temporary Workers 0.058 0.054 0.052 0.041 0.042 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Contractors/Consultants 0.065 0.065 0.060 0.045 0.053 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
On-call Workers 0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 0.009 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Total (Atypical Workforce) 0.131 0.129 0.123 0.094 0.105 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
 
Source: Contingent and Alternative Employment Arrangement Supplement to the Current Population 
Survey, 1995 – 2005 waves. 
 
Note: Results reported as proportions (standard errors). 
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Table 2 
 
Descriptive Statistics of Workers by Working Arrangement 
 
 Contracting/ Regular Temporary 
 Consulting Workers Workers Workers 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Age 35.65** 36.11 35.06**
, a 
 (3.20) (3.33) (2.93) 
 
Black 0.22** 0.31 0.46**
, a 
 
Education 14.15** 13.13 12.73**
, a 
 (2.65) (2.37) (2.27) 
 
Experience 14.60 14.56 11.06**
, a
 (4.42) (5.02) (4.91) 
 
Female 0.39** 0.49 0.53**
, a 
 
Hispanic 0.17 0.18 0.19 
 
Married 0.54** 0.52 0.38**
, a 
 
AFQT Scores 
Coding ability 0.01 -0.05 -0.17**
, a 
 (0.98) (0.99) (1.01) 
 
Math ability 0.26** -0.05 -0.26**
, a 
 (0.91) (0.86) (0.86) 
 
Practical ability 0.41** -0.05 -0.29**
, a 
 (0.91) (0.87) (0.82) 
 
Verbal ability 0.29** -0.04 -0.28**
, a 
 (0.97) (0.95) (1.00) 
 
Job Characteristics  
Employer size (divided by 1,000) 3.10 1.19 2.46** 
 (17.13) (9.15) (14.57) 
 
Part-time 0.48** 0.18 0.32**
, a 
 
Regional Location  
Northeast 0.14 0.14 0.11** 
 
Northcentral 0.19 0.23 0.25 
 
South 0.42 0.43 0.42 
 
West 0.25 0.20 0.22 
Industrial Sector  
Agriculture  0.05** 0.02 0.04** 
 
Construction and mining 0.12** 0.08 0.05**
, a 
 
Manufacturing 0.11** 0.17 0.16
a 
 
40 
 
Transportation, communications 0.06 0.07 0.04** 
and utilities  
 
Retail and wholesale trade  0.10** 0.20 0.11** 
 
Finance, insurance and real estate 0.06 0.06 0.02**
, a 
 
Business services 0.17** 0.08 0.31**
, a 
 
Personal services 0.08 0.06 0.04
a 
 
Professional services 0.23 0.22 0.17**
, a 
 
Public administration 0.01** 0.05 0.06
a 
 
Occupation 
Managers 0.40** 0.26 0.14**
, a 
 
Technical/sales workers 0.19** 0.07 0.05**
, a 
 
Clerical workers 0.02** 0.17 0.27**
, a 
 
Service workers 0.18 0.24 0.18** 
 
Operators/labourers 0.13 0.15 0.28**
, a 
 
Skilled labour 0.07 0.10 0.08 
 
N 227 11,776 782 
 
Notes: Results reported as sample mean (standard deviations). 
a 
denotes significant mean difference between contractors/consultants and 
temporary workers. ** denotes significant mean differences relative to regular workers at the 0.05 level.  
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Table 3 
 
Distribution of Temporary and Contracting/Consulting Work, and Mean Hourly Wages by Work Arrangement and Gender 
(wages expressed in constant 1982-84 dollars) 
 
 
 Whole sample Males Females 
 
(a) Atypical Work [%] (1992 – 98 waves, NLSY79) 
 
Temporary Workers 6.12 5.57 6.68 
Contractors/Consultants 1.78 2.14 1.40 
N 12,785 6,482 6,303 
 
(b) Hourly Wages [$] (1993 – 98 waves, NLSY79) 
 
Regular Workers (RW) 10.79 12.82 8.59 
Temporary Workers (TW) 5.96 6.38 5.61 
Contractors/Consultants (C/C) 13.36 13.77 12.54 
 
(c) Wage Differences [$] (1993 – 98 waves, NLSY79) 
 
RW – TW 4.82*** 6.44** 2.98*** 
 (2.78) (1.98) (3.18) 
 
RW – C/C -2.57 -0.95 -3.95** 
 (1.36) (0.29) (2.32) 
 
TW – C/C -7.40*** -7.40*** -6.93*** 
 (7.58) (5.16) (4.74) 
 
 
Source: NLSY79; 1992 (1993) – 1998 waves. 
Notes: Wages are expressed in constant 1982-84 dollars. |t|-tests of the wage differences are given in parentheses. 
***, ** indicate that the difference is statistically significant at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
 
Employment Duration and Transition Rates by Work Arrangement  
 
(a) Employment Duration, by Work Arrangement 
 
 Contractors/ Regular Temporary 
 Consultants Workers Workers 
 
Average, in years 2.38 4.65 1.09 
(standard deviation) (2.34) (4.87) (1.57) 
 
Median, in years 1.71 2.72 0.58 
 
N 227 11,735 781 
 
 
(b) Transition Rates, by Work Arrangement 
 
  Subsequent or Ending Work Arrangement 
 
 Contractors/ Regular Temporary 
 Consultants Workers Workers 
 
Initial Arrangement 
 
Contractors/Consultants 116 (52.02%) 99 (44.39%) 8 (3.59%) 
 
Regular Workers 88 (0.75%) 11,295 (96.51%) 321 (2.74%) 
 
Temporary Workers 8 (1.03%) 375 (48.45%) 391 (50.52%) 
 
N 212 (1.67%) 11,769 (92.66%) 720 (5.67%) 
 
Source: NLSY79; 1992 (1993) – 1998 waves. 
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Table 5 
 
Exit from Temporary Work to Regular Work  
(estimates from a proportional hazard model, non-parametric baseline hazard specification) 
 Transition from Temporary to Regular Employment 
 Men Women 
Variables (1) (2) 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Age -0.328*** -0.279*** 
 (0.051) (0.039) 
 [0.721] [0.756] 
 
Black 0.700*** 0.228 
 (0.310) (0.266) 
 [2.014] [1.256] 
 
Education 0.105* 0.019 
 (0.058) (0.062) 
 [1.110] [1.019] 
 
Hispanic -0.428 -0.589* 
 (0.360) (0.349) 
 [0.652] [0.554] 
 
Married 0.336 -0.129 
 (0.228) (0.230) 
 [1.399] [0.879] 
 
AFQT Scores 
Coding ability 0.137 -0.091 
 (0.156) (0.131) 
 [1.147] [0.913] 
 
Math ability -0.084 0.015 
 (0.195) (0.211) 
 [0.919] [1.014] 
 
Practical ability 0.305 -0.558* 
 (0.219) (0.291) 
 [1.356] [0.572] 
 
Verbal ability -0.148 0.584*** 
 (0.224) (0.215) 
 [0.862] [1.793] 
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Job Characteristics 
Employer size (divided by 1,000) 0.008 0.001 
 (0.007) (0.006) 
 [1.000] [0.999] 
 
Part-time -0.060 0.008 
 (0.265) (0.225) 
 [0.942] [1.008] 
 
Regional location 
North East -0.748** -0.497 
 (0.374) (0.396) 
 [0.473] [0.608] 
 
South -0.344 -0.055 
 (0.290) (0.249) 
 [0.709] [0.947] 
 
West 0.122 0.145 
 (0.336) (0.336) 
 [1.130] [1.156] 
 
North Central 
a a
 
 
Industrial Sector 
Agriculture  -1.090 0.185 
 (1.444) (0.691) 
 [0.336] [1.203] 
 
Construction and mining -1.069 0.587 
 (1.345) (0.961) 
 [0.344] [1.798] 
 
Manufacturing -1.237 -0.189 
 (1.341) (0.619) 
 [0.290] [0.827] 
 
Transportation, communications -1.170 0.634 
and utilities (1.454) (0.656) 
 [0.310] [1.886] 
 
Retail and wholesale trade -1.298 0.267 
 (1.391) (0.556) 
 [0.273] [1.307] 
 
Business services -0.898 0.407 
 (1.309) (0.594) 
 [0.407] [1.502] 
 
Personal services -2.602* -0.766 
 (1.494) (0.641) 
 [0.074] [0.465] 
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Professional services -1.140 0.098 
 (1.372) (0.573) 
 [0.320] [1.103] 
 
Public administration -1.327 0.096 
 (1.372) (0.633) 
 [0.265] [1.101] 
 
Finance, insurance and real estate 
a a
 
 
Occupation 
Managers -0.015 -0.477 
 (0.680) (0.537) 
 [0.985] [0.621] 
 
Clerical workers  0.580 -0.006 
 (0.911) (0.432) 
 [1.786] [0.994] 
 
Service workers 0.480 0.626 
 (0.709) (0.459) 
 [1.616] [1.869] 
 
Operator/Labourers 0.341 0.021 
 (0.701) (0.464) 
 [1.406] [1.021] 
 
Skilled workers 0.053 0.176 
 (0.746) (0.564) 
 [1.054] [1.192] 
 
Technical/sales 
a a
 
 
Log-likelihood -415.4 -485.8 
 
χ2  120.74 92.38 
 [0.00] [0.00] 
 
N 192 236 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses; hazard ratios in brackets. Standard errors have been clustered by the individual. The 
model χ2 statistic has 28 degrees of freedom and its p-value is shown in brackets. Ability scores were obtained by taking the scores reported 
by the respondents in the 1981 AFQT and regressed on a vector of age and education dummies. The residuals are represented in these 
variables. The test scores were combined into one of four types of ability: verbal, mathematical, practical, and coding ability.  
a
 indicates excluded group. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Table 6 
 
Impact of Temporary and Contract Work Spells on Log Wages, Summary Results  
 Whole Sample Men Women 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
No. Temporary Jobs (NTJ) -0.139*** -0.088 -0.230*** -0.313* -0.065* 0.043 
 (0.032) (0.079) (0.049) (0.183) (0.037) (0.062) 
 
No. Temporary Jobs
2
 0.020 0.017 0.049** 0.044** -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.014) 
 
NTJ*lifetime experience  -0.005  0.019  -0.019* 
  (0.012)  (0.028)  (0.011) 
 
NTJ*lifetime experience
2
  0.000  -0.001  0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
 
No. Contract/Consulting Jobs (NCJ) -0.075 0.125 -0.139 0.223 0.134 0.134 
 (0.089) (0.181) (0.109) (0.280) (0.164) (0.234) 
 
No. Contract/Consulting Jobs
2
 0.084 0.090* 0.102* 0.108* -0.035 -0.007 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.058) (0.059) (0.109) (0.114) 
 
NCJ*lifetime experience  -0.041  -0.059  -0.026 
  (0.037)  (0.054)  (0.036) 
 
NCJ*lifetime experience
2
  0.002  0.002  0.002 
  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
 
Current lifetime experience 0.053*** 0.055*** 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) 
 
Current lifetime experience
2
 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000* -0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
 
R
2
 0.378 0.378 0.344 0.344 0.417 0.418 
Observations 14,138 7,826 6,312 
Individuals 4,731 2,516 2,215 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Each specification also includes region, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, part -time status, occupation, industry, firm size, and 
proxies for ability/aptitude derived from AFQT scores, as well as a measure of worker age. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 7 
 
Impact of Time in Temporary and Contract Work on Log Wages, Summary Results  
 Whole Sample Men Women 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 
No. Years in Temporary Jobs (YTJ) -0.097*** -0.081 -0.167*** -0.262** -0.011 -0.033  
 (0.022) (0.074) (0.032) (0.122) (0.052) (0.109) 
 
No. Years in Temporary Jobs
2
 0.008*** 0.008*** 0.015*** 0.014*** -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.019) (0.019) 
 
YTJ*lifetime experience  -0.002  0.009  0.006 
  (0.011)  (0.018)  (0.013) 
 
YTJ*lifetime experience
2
  0.000  -0.000  -0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.000) 
 
No. Years in Contract/ 0.055 -0.002 0.028 0.288* 0.053 -0.179 
Consulting Jobs (YCJ) (0.034) (0.096) (0.036) (0.156) (0.071) (0.144) 
 
No. Years in Contract/ -0.011 -0.011 -0.012* -0.010 0.004 0.007 
Consulting Jobs
2
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.022) (0.019) 
 
YCJ*lifetime experience  0.007  -0.033**  0.029 
  (0.013)  (0.020)  (0.020) 
 
YCJ*lifetime experience
2
  -0.000  0.001*  -0.001 
  (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001) 
 
Current lifetime experience 0.053*** 0.053*** 0.054*** 0.055*** 0.048*** 0.046*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005) (0.005) 
 
Current lifetime experience
2
 -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.001*** -0.000** -0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
  
R
2
 0.383 0.383 0.351 0.352 0.416 0.416 
Observations 15,949 8,688 7,258 
Individuals 4,811 2,553 2,258 
Notes: Clustered robust standard errors are given in parentheses. Each specification also includes region, race/ethnicity, marital status, education, part-time status, occupation, 
industry, firm size, and proxies for ability/aptitude derived from AFQT scores, as well as a measure of worker age. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 
0.10 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8  
 
Propensity Score Matching Estimates Used to Predict Atypical Work  
(logistic regression procedure) 
 
Variables Contractors/Consultants Temporary Workers 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Age -0.003 -0.028** 
 (0.020) (0.013) 
 
Black 0.169 0.317*** 
 (0.192) (0.117) 
 
Education 0.101*** -0.004 
 (0.027) (0.019) 
 
Female 0.151 -0.011 
 (0.158) (0.100) 
 
Hispanic -0.148 -0.398*** 
 (0.166) (0.114) 
 
Married -0.328*** -0.623*** 
 (0.115) (0.077) 
 
AFQT Scores 
Coding ability -0.157** 0.022 
 (0.070) (0.048) 
 
Math ability -0.017 -0.004 
 (0.105) (0.071) 
 
Practical ability 0.585*** 0.023 
 (0.118) (0.081) 
 
Verbal ability -0.079 0.012 
 (0.108) (0.068) 
 
Job Characteristics 
Employer size (divided by 1,000) 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
 
Part-time 0.995*** 0.540*** 
 (0.146) (0.106) 
 
Regional Location 
North East 0.427** -0.790*** 
 (0.186) (0.141) 
 
South 0.349** -0.348*** 
 (0.161) (0.096) 
 
West 0.519*** 0.021 
 (0.176) (0.114) 
 
North Central 
a
 
a
 
 
  
49 
 
Industrial Sector 
Agriculture  1.042** 0.736** 
 (0.502) (0.305) 
 
Construction and mining 1.549*** 0.261 
 (0.386) (0.248) 
 
Manufacturing 0.576 0.601*** 
 (0.377) (0.199) 
 
Transportation, communication and utilities  1.053*** -0.098 
 (0.393) (0.244) 
 
Retail and wholesale trade 0.496 0.549*** 
 (0.381) (0.201) 
 
Business services 1.839*** 0.965*** 
 (0.369) (0.216) 
 
Personal services 1.709*** 0.682*** 
 (0.396) (0.198) 
 
Professional services 0.896** 0.619** 
 (0.365) (0.242) 
 
Public administration 0.973** 0.420* 
 (0.398) (0.224) 
 
Finance, insurance and real estate 
a
 
a
  
 
Occupation 
Managers -0.245 -0.220 
 (0.199) (0.167) 
 
Clerical workers -0.926*** 0.478*** 
 (0.269) (0.165) 
 
Service workers -0.522** 0.141 
 (0.221) (0.165) 
 
Operators/Labourers -0.467** 0.251 
 (0.231) (0.167) 
 
Skilled workers -0.425* 0.116 
 (0.247) (0.184) 
 
Technical/sales workers 
a
 
a
 
 
N 14,138 14,138 
 
Notes: 
a
 indicates excluded group. ***,**,* denote statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels, respectively.  
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Figure 2 
Predicted Log Wage by Experience Level and Early Employment Patterns, Using the 
Number of Atypical Jobs Held Specification 
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Figure 3 
Predicted Log Wages by Experience Level and Early Employment Patterns Using the 
Years in Atypical Work Specification 
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 Appendix. U.S. Atypical Worker Studies  
Study Dataset Time Period Focus Methodology Findings 
Andersson, 
Holzer, and 
Lane (2009).
a 
Longitudinal 
Employer-Household 
Dynamics Program 
Data for California, 
Florida, Illinois, 
Maryland and North 
Carolina. 
1993 - 2001; 
Evaluated job type 
held in base period 
(1993-95) and 
earnings in 
subsequent three year 
periods: 1996-98, 
1999-2001. 
Primary focus is on low income 
workers (those earning $12,000 
or less in base year). 
OLS regressions were used, controls 
include holding temporary help 
supply employment, and firm- and 
person-fixed effects. 
Those who were temps and turned 
permanent for the next two periods 
seemed to have benefited from initial 
temp job. Benefit diminishes over 
time, but is still significant in the 
second time period. Results are 
sensitive to specification. 
Autor and 
Houseman 
(2006).
b 
Quasi-experimental 
Work First data from 
Detroit, Michigan. 
1993 – 2003. Former welfare recipients and 
their employment/wage histories 
based upon random assignment 
by a third-party contractor to 
temporary, direct-hire, and no job 
placement. 
Instrumental variables approach 
using contractor as instrument for 
agency temporary employment. 
Evaluated effect of agency temporary 
employment on probability of 
escaping poverty and likelihood of 
welfare case closing due to sufficient 
earnings. 
In the short-run, earnings outcomes 
of agency temporaries higher than 
those receiving no job placement, but 
varies little from those receiving 
direct-hire placements. Over one to 
two year period, the benefit 
dissipates relative to no placement 
for the marginal workers. 
Hamersma 
and Heinrich 
(2008). 
Wisconsin UI 
Administrative data 
matched to both Work 
Opportunity Tax 
Credit 
(WOTC)/Welfare to 
Work program 
database and Client 
Assistance for 
Reemployment and 
Economic Support 
data. 
Focused on those 
taking WOTC or 
THS job in 1999 – 
2001. 
Compared wage/employment 
effects of WOTC recipients 
employed in temporary 
employment versus non-
temporary employment. Sample 
was limited to those aged 18 – 25 
years who either received food 
stamps or were former welfare 
recipients. 
Propensity score matching 
estimation; evaluated total earnings 
at job and quarters employed. 
No significant difference in either 
total earnings or average quarterly 
earnings between WOTC recipients 
employed by a temporary help 
service and those employed by an 
end user. 
Heinrich, 
Mueser, and 
Troske 
(2005). 
Missouri and North 
Carolina Temporary 
Assistance for Needy 
Families (TANF) 
administrative data. 
Data from Missouri 
spans 1993 to 1997; 
North Carolina data 
is limited to 1997. 
Focus was on welfare recipients 
and the employment outcomes 
experienced by those holding 
temporary employment against 
those with no jobs, non-
temporary employment or 
holding multiple jobs. 
OLS regressions after correcting for 
selection into temporary 
employment. 
Welfare recipients employed in 
temporary employment fare poorly 
relative to non-temporary 
employment. This negative effect 
diminishes over time as temporary 
workers subsequently move into 
other employment types. 
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Notes: 
a
See also Andersson, Holzer, and Lane (2005). 
b
See also Autor and Houseman (2010). 
Heinrich, 
Mueser, and 
Troske 
(2009). 
Unemployment 
Insurance data from 
Missouri. 
1997 and 2001. Job losers in 1997/2001 or 
received retraining/alternative 
employment. 
Difference-in-difference estimation, 
compares earnings in first quarter 
against those observed eight quarters 
later. Compares wage differences for 
those initially holding no job, a 
temporary help services job, and 
those in other industries. 
Results are similar for good 
economic periods (1997 entrants) as 
for bad economic periods (2001 
entrants). Those initially holding a 
temporary help service position, 
while starting out with significantly 
lower earnings relative to other jobs, 
experience faster wage growth over 
eight quarters thereby partly catching 
up to other employment types. 
Lane, 
Mikelson, 
Sharkey, and 
Wissoker 
(2003). 
Wage analyses were 
conducted using the 
Survey of Income and 
Program Participation. 
(CPS for employment 
outcomes.) 
1990 – 1993. Focus was on workers estimated 
to be at risk of welfare recipiency. 
Propensity score matching estimates 
of the effect temporary employment 
has on wages. The estimates are 
conditioned on initial labour market 
state and employment status 
observed one month later. 
Key finding is that those who moved 
from traditional employment into 
either temporary employment or 
unemployment fared better, one year 
later, if they chose the first option. 
However, those at-risk workers, 
entering a temporary job from 
unemployment earned lower wages 
one year later relative to those who 
initially secured a traditional job. 
Segal and 
Sullivan 
(1998). 
Administrative files 
from the Washington 
State UI system 
1984 to 1994. Primary focus was to estimate the 
wage differentials associated with 
temporary work against non-
temporary work. The effect of 
temp work 8 quarters prior/after 
spell of such employment was 
evaluated. 
OLS regressions. Fixed effects were 
included to control for unobserved 
heterogeneity as well as to address a 
lack of data on demographic and 
occupational characteristics. 
Negative wage differentials were 
found to be associated with 
employment in temporary help 
services industry. Wages prior/after 
temporary employment spell were 
lower than what would otherwise 
have been observed for workers who 
never entered temporary 
employment. 
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Table A.1 
 
Employment Duration and Transition Rates, by Gender 
 
(a) Employment Duration, by Work Arrangement 
 
 Men Women 
 
 Contractors/ Regular Temporary Contractors/ Regular Temporary 
 Consultants Workers Workers Consultants Workers Workers 
 
Average, in years 2.35 4.73 1.16 2.44 4.57 1.04 
(standard deviation) (2.34) (5.12) (1.69) (2.37) (4.87) (1.47) 
 
Median, in years 1.55 2.68 0.58 1.78 2.78 0.56 
 
N 139 5,959 361 88 5,776 420 
 
 
(b) Transition Rates, by Work Arrangement 
 
 Men Women 
 
 Contractors/ Regular Temporary Contractors/ Regular Temporary 
 Consultants Workers Workers Consultants Workers Workers 
 
Contractors/Consultants 72 (52.94%) 60 (44.12%) 4 (2.94%) 44 (50.57%) 39 (44.83%) 4 (4.60%) 
 
Regular Workers 57 (0.96%) 5,724 (96.40%) 157 (2.64%) 31 (0.54%) 5,571 (96.62%) 164 (2.84%) 
 
Temporary Workers 4 (1.12%) 185 (51.68%) 169 (47.21%) 4 (0.96%) 190 (45.67%) 222 (53.37%) 
 
N 133 (2.07%) 5,969 (92.80%) 330 (5.13%) 79 (1.26%) 5,800 (92.52%) 390 (6.22%) 
 
Source: NLSY79, 1992 (1993) – 1998 waves. 
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Table A.2 
 
Test of Covariate Imbalance 
   
  Temporary Worker Status   Contractors/Consultants Status 
   Percentage     Percentage 
 Treated Control Bias |t| p>|t| Treated Control Bias |t| p>|t| 
 
Individual Characteristics 
Age 33.32 33.32 0.0 0.00 1.00 33.50 33.030 7.0 0.93 0.35 
 
Black 0.41 0.43 -5.1 0.96 0.43 0.25 0.25 0.0 0.00 1.00 
 
Education 13.05 12.96 3.8 0.79 0.43 13.94 13.90 1.7 0.22 0.83 
 
Female 0.49 0.50 -1.7 0.35 0.73 0.39 0.39 0.6 0.08 0.94 
 
Hispanic 0.40 0.37 5.0 1.03 0.31 0.58 0.59 -2.3 0.31 0.76 
 
Married 0.41 0.43 -2.3 0.45 0.65 0.53 0.56 -5.8 0.76 0.45 
 
AFQT Scores 
Coding ability -0.06 -0.10 3.8 0.78 0.44 -0.03 -0.08 4.9 0.63 0.53 
 
Practical ability -0.10 -0.14 4.4 0.90 0.37 0.39 0.45 -6.3 0.80 0.42 
 
Math ability -0.07 -0.13 6.7 1.39 0.16 0.24 0.25 -1.0 0.13 0.90 
 
Verbal ability -0.09 -0.12 3.2 0.64 0.52 0.24 0.28 -3.8 0.51 0.61 
 
Job Characteristics 
Employer size (divided 
By 1,000) 1.19 0.88 3.9 0.83 0.41 1.16 1.02 1.7 0.22 0.82 
 
Part-time 0.17 0.016 3.6 0.67 0.50 0.22 0.25 -7.1 0.81 0.42 
 
Regional Location 
North East 0.09 0.10 -4.1 0.93 0.35 0.17 0.16 3.1 0.41 0.68 
 
North Central  0.28 0.28 -0.6 0.11 0.91 0.19 0.20 -2.8 0.38 0.70 
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South 0.40 0.40 0.5 0.10 0.92 0.39 0.37 3.0 0.39 0.70 
 
West 0.23 0.21 3.4 0.66 0.51 0.26 0.27 -3.5 0.43 0.67 
 
Industrial Sector 
Agriculture 0.02 0.02 0.0 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.04 -11.8 1.30 0.19 
 
Construction and mining 0.05 0.06 -1.0 0.22 0.83 0.13 0.11 5.7 0.70 0.49 
 
Manufacturing 0.20 0.23 -5.9 -1.15 0.25 0.12 0.12 0.0 0.00 1.00 
 
Transportation, communication 
and utilities 0.05 0.04 4.5 1.11 0.27 0.08 0.09 -2.1 0.27 0.78 
 
Retail and wholesale trade 0.18 0.17 2.0 0.39 0.69 0.10 0.09 5.1 0.78 0.44 
 
Finance, insurance and  
real estate 0.04 0.04 0.5 0.12 0.90 0.03 0.04 -5.4 0.87 0.39 
 
Business services 0.10 0.10 0.5 0.08 0.93 0.15 0.17 -6.6 0.72 0.47 
 
Personal services 0.06 0.05 4.0 0.79 0.43 0.09 0.07 8.3 1.00 0.32 
 
Professional services 0.21 0.21 0.0 0.00 1.00 0.20 0.21 -2.2 0.28 0.78 
 
Public administration 0.08 0.08 -1.3 0.27 0.79 0.08 0.07 3.1 0.44 0.66 
 
Occupation 
Managers 0.17 0.16 2.7 0.60 0.55 0.35 0.32 6.9 0.89 0.38 
 
Technical/sales workers 0.07 0.07 0.5 0.10 0.92 0.11 0.07 11.9 1.60 0.11 
 
Clerical workers 0.21 0.20 2.6 0.50 0.62 0.07 0.10 -9.2 1.35 0.18 
 
Service workers 0.24 0.27 -6.0 1.15 0.25 0.20 0.22 -4.6 0.56 0.58 
 
Operators/labourers 0.20 0.21 -1.6 0.31 0.76 0.15 0.17 -7.1 0.93 0.35 
 
Skilled workers 0.11 0.10 2.7 0.57 0.57 0.12 0.11 1.8 0.24 0.81 
 
